Akhil Ilango
Assistant Professor of Economics
Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore
Primary field: Industrial Organisation
Currently working on: Digital Economy, Market Power, Lobbying, Misallocation
You can access my CV and Research here.
You can reach me at:
Publications
* Sleeping With The Enemy? How Constituents Constrain Politicians’ Behavior Towards Interest Groups
with Miguel Espinosa and Sergio Galleta and Giorgio Zanarone
Forthcoming: The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization
Abstract
Draft
Do constituents limit interest groups' influence over elected officials? Using new data on congressional speeches, campaign donations, and over 10 million lobbying contacts from FARA filings, we track politicians’ responses to international events that raise the political cost of appearing too close to foreign governments. We find three main results. First, politicians strongly connected to shocked countries lose local campaign contributions after a shock. Second, they are less willing than weakly connected politicians to praise the affected country in their speeches. Third, while weakly connected politicians increase in-person meetings with the lobbyists of shocked countries, strongly connected ones shift to remote contacts. We show that a simple relational contracting model can explain these findings. Overall, our study suggests that politicians' concern with their constituents' reaction can deter foreign influence—but only partially. Politicians and interest groups adjust to reputational shocks, forming new ties and reshaping old ones to navigate public scrutiny.
Working Papers
* Sponsored Search and Product Market Concentration
Submitted
Abstract
Draft
This paper examines how sponsored search auctions shape product market
competition. I develop a model in which firms bid for prominence on a
platform and set prices, under a cost-per-click commission model. Consumers
observe prices before search but incur costs to learn match values. The analysis
reveals a novel mechanism: ad commissions pass through asymmetrically to
prices. For the prominent firm, commissions function like a fixed cost, leaving
its price largely unaffected; for the non-prominent firm, they act as a marginal
cost, raising its price. This asymmetry reduces competition and can even
reverse price rankings. I explore alternative commission models and provide
suggestive empirical evidence consistent with the theory.
* Identity, Market Access, and Demand-led Diversification
with Sampreet Goraya
Revise and Resubmit: Journal of the European Economic Association
Abstract
Draft
Summary
Using Indian microdata on employer-employee caste composition and household consumption, we document demand segmentation along caste lines, limiting firms' market penetration and reducing firm size in the economy. We develop a model where consumers prefer goods produced by socially closer groups, and firms overcome these barriers by hiring employees from the target consumer group. We identify the structural parameters governing demand segmentation using rainfall-induced demand shocks. Counterfactuals indicate that social identity-driven barriers restrict the growth of high-quality firms while sustaining low-quality ones. Lowering the cost of hiring out-group employees expands firm size by improving market access and enhances consumer welfare through greater variety of products.
* Application Compatibility in the Presence of Preference for Variety
with Gaurav Jakhu
Submitted
* Beyond the Bill: Public Insurance, Household Portfolios, and Credit Reallocation
with Ayona Bhattacharjee, Kalyan Kolukuluri, and Chetan Subramanian
Abstract
When a poor household in India needs hospital care, the bill is often paid with borrowed
money, much of it borrowed from relatives and friends. We study how India’s national
hospital insurance programme, PM-JAY, changed the balance sheets of the poorest
households, comparing neighbours across state borders before and after the launch. In
the bottom income decile, medical debt fell by 28 per cent of its pre-launch level, mostly
debt owed to relatives and friends, and a new illness no longer led to debt. Households
also saved less in gold and more in formal deposits, and their borrowing moved from
moneylenders and self-help groups to formal lenders and planned purchases. However,
moneylender borrowing rose among the richest tenth. We show that a model in which
bills become debt when they exceed cash at hand, insurance lowers the value of a liquid
buffer, and formal lenders screen on distress risk can account for these changes. Each
rupee of claims is worth about two rupees to covered households, and targeting the
poorest households yields greater welfare than either universal coverage at the same
fiscal cost or coverage targeted to households with the highest predicted hospitalisation
risk.
Work In-Progress
* Anchors and Agnostics: Insider-Outsider responses to uncertainty on the Monetary Policy Committee
with Chetan Subramanian
Book Chapters
* Current Challenges for Competition in Online Advertising Markets
with Rosa Ferrer and Paul Richter
in Reforms to foster competition in Spain, edited by Juanjo Ganuza and Joaquín López Vallés,
published by The Spanish National Markets and Competition Commission (CNMC)
Abstract (in Spanish)
Draft (in Spanish)
Tanto en EE. UU. como en España, la publicidad online ya supuso en 2021 más del 50 por
100 del gasto total en publicidad. Unido a múltiples retos ya conocidos por los economistas
(barreras de entrada por economías de escala, switching costs, efectos de red), la publicidad
online añade además la personalización de la publicidad y las dificultades para preservar la
privacidad. Veremos que la publicidad online potencialmente puede tanto favorecer como
dificultar la competencia. Repasaremos literatura académica que ofrece claves para identificar
y cuantificar formas en que la publicidad online puede generar barreras a la competencia y
daños a los consumidores.
Links
Monthly favourites
- Watch: Shoplifters, (2018) - Japan
- Read: The Paper Menagerie, by Ken Liu
Previous
- Watch: Shoplifters, (2018) - Japan
- Read: The Paper Menagerie, by Ken Liu
- Defunct blog
Translations
- night comes first (ongoing): முதலில் இரவு வரும் - ஆதவன், 1985 (Tamil)